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Plan sponsors and fiduciaries1 have traditionally relied on advisers—from attorneys to 
accountants to benefit consultants—to help guide decisions with respect to their retirement plans. 
For decades, a cornerstone of this assistance has been making recommendations about retirement 
plan investment portfolios. With the rise of both defined contribution (DC) plans and cyberattacks 
on financial institutions, a number of plan sponsors and their advisers have started to focus more 
time and resources on the security of their plan data, including the participant information held by 
service providers. 
As plan sponsors and their advisers ask these providers more questions about cybersecurity, 
resistance to answering those inquiries has also risen. Service providers recognize the right of plan 
sponsors to confirm their participants’ data is protected but fear the information, if distributed, 
could help cybercriminals breach systems. 
Government regulators continue to grapple with how to develop workable regulatory 
structures. Rules by nature limit how providers can operate, which in turn helps cybercriminals 
focus their efforts at undermining those regulations. The United States Department of Labor 
(DOL) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Advisory Council 
have, consistent with the flexibility adopted in other parts of ERISA, not required one single 
approach to ensure cybersecurity. States too have entered the cybersecurity discussion but, given 
ERISA preemption standards and the multistate nature of many retirement plans, face many 
challenges in imposing their own requirements upon ERISA plans. 
The retirement industry itself has begun to develop its own solutions by working with all 
stakeholders—service providers of all shapes and sizes as well as plan sponsors. In this chapter, 
we present a solution for the challenge of verifying the cybersecurity capabilities of providers 
without revealing information that could help cybercriminals. The potential solution we present in 
 
 
this paper relies on attestations provided by trusted third parties to audit the providers with a 
consistent set of standards. Since it is not a regulated solution, this approach is flexible enough to 
allow industry members to use whatever data security frameworks they feel are most appropriate 
for their organizations. Yet while providers are free under this potential solution to use frameworks 
of their choosing, the reporting of the controls used and how these controls were tested is designed 
to fit a uniform basic framework.  
This chapter discusses the development, the components, and the communications process 
for this uniform basic framework, incorporating the perspectives of an investment consultant, a 
data security professional, and two lawyers. Retirement plans commonly employ advisers to assist 
with fiduciary oversight tasks such as selecting funds, benchmarking fees, and choosing third-
party vendors such as recordkeepers, trustees, and custodians. These advisers include investment 
consulting firms, accountants, attorneys, and other industry experts. The vendor selection process 
is often led by investment consulting firms. The core competencies of these consulting firms are 
typically services such as asset allocation, capital market research, investment manager selection, 
monitoring, and other affiliated services. For many of these firms, the optimal approach to 
conducting vendor due diligence on complex administrative tasks has been to rely on third 
parties—whether auditors, attorneys, or other services—to verify the accuracy and thoroughness 
of the vendor’s procedures. As DC plans have grown to be a larger part of the marketplace, these 
consulting firms shifted focus from defined benefit (DB) to DC services, and that shift included 
developing the ability to select and monitor recordkeepers and custodians.  
 Until now, firms conducting most of the vendor search and due diligence services in the 
marketplace have not had a primary focus on matters such as cybersecurity. Yet a handful of 
 
 
leading-edge firms has been developing ways to help plan sponsors evaluate the cybersecurity 
protocols of their service providers.  
 At present, there is no consensus within the industry regarding which cybersecurity 
framework constitutes a ‘best practice’ approach. Additionally, the major frameworks address the 
matter slightly differently, and the implementation of each framework introduces additional 
variability.  
 The process of assessing security is further complicated by a destructive information cycle. 
Recordkeepers have significant incentives to reveal only a limited amount of information about 
their cyber defenses, because hackers can learn from extensive revelations to adapt their methods 
and avoid detection. This means that recordkeepers often rationally respond with only limited 
information about cyberattacks. This, in turn, causes some plan sponsors and consultants to react 
with renewed vigor in their efforts to confirm the adequacy of defenses, which can lead to either 
frustration or to recordkeepers complying with the requests, weakening their defenses.  
 There is significant room to improve the measurement of security within the vendor 
community, and later sections of this chapter will address the efforts SPARK and the ERISA 
Advisory Council, among others, have made in that direction. Ultimately, it is clear that the lack 
of cybersecurity expertise in the adviser community, the need for plan sponsors to protect 
participant data, and the lack of a uniform standard or process for third-party audits of 
cybersecurity measures, all call for a solution. That solution will ultimately very likely include an 
industry standard that permits third-party audit.   
 
Existing Regulatory Structure 
 
 
Gramm Leach Bliley. The ‘Safeguard Rule’ of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) 
requires that covered U.S. financial institutions safeguard sensitive data (15 U.S.C. 6801). 
Businesses that are significantly engaged in providing financial products or services, such as banks 
and brokers, are covered financial institutions that must safeguard customers’ personal 
information. This personal information includes nonpublic information that is personally 
identifiable financial information (known as National Provider Identifier, or NPI) collected by the 
financial institution. Items such as names, social security numbers, debt and payment history, and 
account numbers can be NPI when provided by the customer to the financial institution.  
According to the law, the goal of the Safeguard Rule is to:  
Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; 
protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of 
such records; and protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records 
or information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
customer. (5 U.S.C. 6801(b)).  
 
It establishes standards relating to physical, technical, and administrative information safeguards. 
It also requires a written information security program that contains certain basic elements, has a 
continuous life-cycle, and is subject to revision as experience warrants.  
The written plan must include (16 C.F.R. § 314): 
(1) The appointment of a person responsible for coordinating the program; 
(2) Identification of reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks, and an 
assessment of the sufficiency of any safeguards against those risks in these 
areas: 
a. Employee training and management  
b. Information systems, including information processing, storage, 
transmission and disposal, network software and design 
c. Detection, prevention, and response to attacks, intrusions, or other 
systems failures 
(3) The procedure for designing, implementing, and testing of information 
safeguards 
(4) Protocols for overseeing service providers capable of maintaining appropriate 
safeguards 
 
 
(5) Rules for evaluating and adjusting the security program to react to any material 
business changes. 
 
Under the Safeguard Rule, it is interesting to note, there is no obligation for a financial institution 
to disclose its information security program. 
Title V privacy. Under GLBA’s ‘Privacy Rule,’ financial institutions in possession of NPI must 
also provide customers with notices regarding the use of their NPI and give them the opportunity 
to opt out of sharing that data with unaffiliated third parties, unless subject to an exception (15 
U.S.C. § 6802).  
Prudent protections. ERISA imposes a standard of care on plan fiduciaries. One becomes a plan 
fiduciary either by being named as such, or through actions that result in the exercise of 
discretionary authority or control with respect to the management of a plan or its assets; providing 
investment advice for compensation; or having discretionary authority or responsibility in the 
administration of a plan (ERISA § 3(21)).  
Fiduciaries are subject to the prudent expert standard of care and owe a duty of loyalty to 
the plan participants. A prudent expert acts with the care, skill, and diligence that the circumstances 
call for a person of like character and like aims to use. Fiduciaries must discharge their duties 
solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits to those participants and beneficiaries (ERISA § 404). 
ERISA also requires that plan assets be held in trust by one or more trustees and that the 
indicia of ownership of such assets be held within the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United 
States (ERISA §§ 403 and 404). 
Undeniably, the monetary assets of the participant accounts are plan assets and a fiduciary 
must undertake prudent steps to protect them from theft, including theft by means of a cyberbreach. 
However, unlike the HIPAA rules (45 C.F.R. 160, 162, and 164) that apply to health care data for 
 
 
ERISA-covered health care plans, there is no clear ERISA regulatory scheme governing the 
protection of financial information in retirement plans. 
Whether a failure to protect retirement-related financial data results in a fiduciary breach 
turns on whether the financial data is considered a plan asset. If it is a plan asset, then failure to 
take prudent steps to prevent its loss or misuse likely results in a fiduciary breach.  
Several different tests could be applied to determine whether plan data is a plan asset, 
although none have been applied by a court directly to personal financial data. It has been the 
DOL’s position that ‘the assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of ordinary 
notions of property rights under non-ERISA law’ (DOL Adv. Op. 92-02A (Jan 17, 1992)). Courts 
have applied other tests such as whether the data have any value and whether the assets were 
viewed or treated as plan assets (Patient Advocates, LLC v. Prysunka, 316 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D. 
Me. 2004)). In Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, the court said that  
[i]n order to determine whether a particular item constitutes an ‘asset of the plan,’ it is 
necessary to determine whether the item in question may be used to the benefit (financial 
or otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of the plan participants or beneficiaries (950 
F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.1990)).  
 
Another court found that plan assets must have some sort of inherent value, be capable of the 
assignment of value, or otherwise be subject to market forces (Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 
423, 425 (6th Cir. 1998)).  
The need to protect the privacy of certain participant information has been directly 
addressed by the USDOL. For example, information relating to participant actions related to 
employer securities is briefly touched upon in the context of ERISA section 404(c). Additionally, 
the concept of securing private participant information in connection with a retirement plan is also 
raised by DOL Technical Release No. 2011-03 addressing certain electronic disclosures.   
 
 
Given the focus on the value of personal data in our society, a conservative approach is to 
treat plan participant financial data as being a plan asset and take prudent steps to protect it as such. 
International regulations. The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is 
the foremost set of European rules on information privacy,2 with requirements applying as of May 
2018. ‘Data subjects’ are persons that provide their individual information to companies, if they 
are identifiable from that information. Personal data includes financial data. These data subjects 
have rights under the GDPR with regard to companies that ‘process’ the data. Processing data has 
a very broad definition that includes collection and storage. There are core principles that apply to 
the companies that possess the data including: lawfulness, fairness, and transparency; purpose 
limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and 
accountability. These principles encompass many of the goals found in the separate privacy laws 
in the United States, but they are combined into a single scheme that is applicable much more 
broadly than any current U.S. law. Under the GDPR, data subjects have many rights, including the 
right to be ‘forgotten,’ or erased from a company’s data; the right to portability of the data; and 
the right not to be profiled if this has legal effects on the data subject. 
The GDPR imposes many rules on the companies that act as a data controller and data 
processer regarding the safeguarding of personal data aimed towards achieving the core principles. 
These range from required contractual provisions to notifications of a breach.   
This regulatory scheme is acknowledged as being one of, if not the most, comprehensive 
data protection regimes in the world. The GDPR has some extraterritorial implications applying 
to data from Europeans outside of Europe that are less likely to apply to a U.S.-based retirement 
plan, but potentially could apply. 
 
 
 
Regulatory Directions 
There is no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing cybersecurity for 
retirement plans in the US. Likewise, there is no comprehensive federal scheme that covers their 
service providers, as not all are subject to GLBA. ERISA is silent on data protection in the form 
of electronic records, and the US courts have not yet decided whether managing cybersecurity risk 
is a fiduciary function. Many providers that service the retirement market are covered by federal 
rules based on their industry. However, these same retirement plan service providers often cross 
several different industries, making compliance more of a patchwork. 
To address these gaps, some states have started to create their own laws which typically 
address breach notifications and private rights of action for any unauthorized disclosures of 
protected personal information. While several state attorneys general have been active in enforcing 
these laws in cyberbreach cases, a state-by-state framework remains a patchwork solution.  
ERISA Advisory Council. Despite a lack of federal regulation, the DOL and the ERISA Advisory 
Council (2016) recently recommended that the DOL communicate to the employee benefits 
community the cybersecurity risks and potential approaches for managing those risks (ERISA 
2016). The ERISA Advisory Council’s proposal to the DOL included guidance for plan sponsors 
on how to evaluate cyber-risks for their benefit plans, requiring them to: understand the plan’s 
data; know the different security frameworks used to protect data; build an adaptive cybersecurity 
process that includes implementation and monitoring, testing and updating, reporting, training, 
controlling access, data retention and destruction, and third-party risk management. Additionally, 
the guidance required these sponsors to: customize a strategy to fit the unique needs of the plan 
sponsor; balance the plan sponsor’s threats based on size, complexity, and risk exposure; and 
address state law considerations. 
 
 
 While ERISA does not outline specific rules for protecting data, the DOL did recognize 
the risks associated with electronic communications of plan information. For instance, in 
Regulation Section 2520.104b-1(c), the DOL addressed electronic distribution of plan information 
to participants, by saying that plan administrators must take appropriate measures to ‘protect the 
confidentiality of personal information relating to the individual's accounts and benefits.’ These 
measures were designed to prevent unauthorized receipt of information or access to such 
information by individuals other than the intended user. Additionally, DOL Technical Release No. 
2011-03 addressed participant information available on administrators’ websites and required the 
plan administrator to take appropriate and necessary measures reasonably calculated to ensure that 
the electronic delivery system protects the confidentiality of all personal information. How best to 
achieve the confidentiality of personal information relating to individuals’ accounts and benefits 
is not well defined. 
Despite the ERISA Advisory Council’s recommendations on how to evaluate risks, 
important questions remain unanswered. For example, is cybersecurity an ERISA fiduciary 
responsibility? If so, does ERISA preempt state cybersecurity laws? Plan sponsors and service 
providers already take seriously their responsibilities to protect participant data, but where are the 
lines of responsibilities and accountability in the event of a breach?  
 
Other Legal Considerations 
For some plans, such as state and local government-sponsored plans, ERISA and its 
preemption do not apply. Moreover, even for ERISA-covered plans, it is not clear that state privacy 
or cybersecurity statutes would be preempted by ERISA.  
 
 
Governmental plans. Many governmental plans, especially on the state level, have adopted 
ERISA statutory language nearly word-for-word. For example, retirement systems in numerous 
states such as the District of Columbia, Illinois, and Ohio, have used substantially the same 
language as ERISA to govern state plans (7 DCMR 15; 40 ILCS 5/; ORC145.01). Most of these 
plans will look to how an ERISA plan or an ERISA service provider would address the same 
situation, in order to determine what actions and remedies are appropriate. A court would also do 
the same in these jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions, the fiduciary concepts are similar to ERISA 
even when the statutory language is different, and courts are again likely to look to ERISA 
precedent. 
State statutes. While ERISA was intended to prevent a patchwork of state law requirements from 
applying to the same plan, it is not clear that personal privacy and cybersecurity statutes would be 
preempted by ERISA. Clearly ERISA predates the widespread use of the internet and the general 
awareness of cyberthreats. The lack of comprehensive financial privacy protections in ERISA 
could lead courts to determine that no ERISA preemption occurs with respect to state protections. 
A majority of states have statutes regarding privacy, cybersecurity, financial information, or all of 
the above. For example, Massachusetts has its ‘Standards for the Protection of Personal 
Information of Residents of the Commonwealth’ (201 CMR 17.04). A written information security 
program is required for entities including employers that maintain personally identifiable financial 
information about a Massachusetts resident. Statutes and regulations such as those adopted by 
Massachusetts can provide plan sponsors, fiduciaries, and service providers with additional 
reference points for constructing their own cybersecurity protocols for retirement plans. 
Another prominent example is the New York Department of Financial Services regulation, 
considered to be one of the most comprehensive cyber-security regulations at the state level. 
 
 
Entitled Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, the ruling was 
promulgated in 2017 and covers financial services companies operating under a license or 
certification issued under the New York Banking, Insurance, or Financial Services laws (23 
NYCRR 500). It aims to set certain minimum standards for cyber-security programs that keep pace 
with technological advances, while promoting the protection of customer information. It requires 
involvement from senior level management to file an annual statement of compliance with the 
New York Department of Financial Services. While there are staged deadlines, compliance 
generally requires having a cyber-security program, policies, penetration testing, an incident 
recovery plan, risk assessment, encryption of non-public information, and training and monitoring 
(Id.). 
Cybersecurity breach examples. Cyberbreaches have become an unfortunate part of commerce 
today. Whenever and wherever value has been stored, thieves have always tried to take it. The 
motives remain the same, but the methods and means of stealing have adapted to where and how 
we store value. The United States is by far the number one target, followed by the United Kingdom 
(Tech World 2017). Some of the most infamous breaches of the last several years have exposed 
millions and in a few cases, billions of individuals to identity theft. Well-known cases include:  
(1) Uber: Over 57 million customers and drivers had their names, emails, and phone numbers 
stolen in 2016; 
(2) Target: In 2013, the firm’s customers had their names, credit/debit card numbers, 
expiration dates, and card values stolen. The theft involved over 70 million retail customer 
accounts. Investigations showed the thieves entered the retailer’s systems through a third-
party refrigeration company hired by Target to help renovate some stores; and 
 
 
(3) Equifax: This firm’s 2017 breach is one of the most serious ever because it included the 
names, social security numbers, dates of birth, and addresses for more than 143 million. 
Cyberattacks tend to fall into several general categories which information security officers 
use to identify countermeasures and solutions based on the different types of attacks: 
Phishing. Hackers pose as a trusted vendor or third party and request data, often providing a link 
for victims to enter personal data. While phishing emails have gotten much more sophisticated in 
recent years, consumers have also become more sophisticated. Many consumers verify such 
requests directly with their financial institutions before clicking on links or providing information. 
Nevertheless, a vulnerable population and a favorite target for hackers are the elderly. To combat 
these attacks, most companies stress to clients that they will not ask for personal information via 
email, and tell them that if they receive such a request they should report it immediately to the 
firm. 
Malware. This term includes several cyberthreats such as trojans, viruses, and worms. In simple 
terms it refers to any code with malicious intent that typically steals or destroys data or locks a 
computer. Recordkeepers protect against such attacks through firewalls that catch malware 
programs before they get into a system, or by educating employees not to click on suspicious links 
or download attachments from unknown senders. This is sometimes done by deploying robust and 
updated firewalls, which prevent the transfer of large data files over the network to weed out 
attachments that may contain malware. It is also important to continually ensure all computer 
operating systems are updated and use the most recent security programs. 
Rouge Software. This is a newer type of malware that masquerades as legitimate security software. 
The criminal designs the software to make pop-up windows and alerts that look authentic. Once a 
user downloads the new security software, the corrupt software is downloaded to the user’s 
 
 
computer. An organization’s information technology practices can help prevent these attacks with 
updated firewalls or trusted anti-virus or anti-spyware software. 
Password Attacks. These happen when a thief gains access to a customer’s account by cracking 
the user’s password. This type of attack is often simple and does not usually require any type of 
malicious code or software. Hackers use software to guess passwords by comparing various word 
combinations against a dictionary file. Recordkeepers typically require their clients to use 
sophisticated passwords that include a combination of letters, numbers, and special characters, as 
well as limiting the number of failed login attempts. 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks. A DoS attack disrupts the service to a network. Attackers will 
send a high volume of data requests to a network until it becomes overloaded and can no longer 
function. Attackers typically use several means of attack, but the most common is the distributed-
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack: this involves the attacker using multiple computers to send the 
traffic or data to overload the system. Often computer users do not even realize that their computers 
have been hijacked. Many of these types of attacks are not intended to steal data or money, but to 
protest something. Although recordkeepers are not typically the targets of these types of attacks, 
they help prevent them by monitoring security as well as data flows to identify any unusual or 
threatening spikes in traffic before these become a problem. DoS attacks can also be accomplished 
by physically cutting cables or disconnecting servers, which is why firms also protect their physical 
properties and systems. 
‘Man in the Middle’ (MITM). Sophisticated hackers will often impersonate an organization’s login 
page or endpoint. From here they will ask the client for online information. For example, if you 
are banking online, the man in the middle would communicate with you by impersonating your 
bank, and communicate with the bank by impersonating you. The man in the middle would then 
 
 
receive all the information transferred between both parties, which could include sensitive data 
such as bank accounts and personal information. Recordkeepers and other financial firms usually 
require clients to use only encrypted access points.  
Drive-By Downloads. Through malware on a legitimate website or detachable drive, a program is 
downloaded to a user’s system just by visiting the site or connecting to the target’s system. 
Typically, a small snippet of code is downloaded to the user’s system and that code then reaches 
out to another computer to get the rest of the program. It often exploits vulnerabilities in the user’s 
operating system or in other programs. Some thieves have even labeled thumb drives with ‘payroll’ 
and dropped them in an organization’s parking lot. The intent is for an unsuspecting employee to 
pick up the thumb drive and connect it to a secure computer. Once that happens, the malware code 
is released. Organizations protect against these attacks in various ways such as education, strict 
rules against use of detachable drives, and restrictions on web browsing. 
 
Data Security Best Practices 
The Data Security Oversight Board (DSOB) of Spark Institute has developed standards to 
help recordkeepers communicate the full capabilities of their cybersecurity systems to plan 
sponsors, consultants, and others. These standards are not intended to provide a recommended 
level of cyber protection or guarantee against a data breach or loss. Instead, these standards are 
intended to help establish a uniform communications tool to assist plan sponsors and service 
providers in properly assessing and comparing retirement plan vendors. 
Plan sponsors and their consultants generally understand that recordkeepers need to 
maintain a level of secrecy around the products and processes used to secure client data. 
Conversely, recordkeepers know that clients and prospects have legitimate needs to understand 
 
 
how their data are protected. These standards establish a base of communication between 
recordkeepers and sponsors using independent third-party audits of cybersecurity controls. With 
this tool, vendors can properly validate the robust nature of their cybersecurity systems and provide 
assurances to clients and prospects that their systems are protected against hackers. 
A firm’s overall data security capabilities identify recommended control objectives in 16 
areas critical to data security as defined by SPARK. The resulting audit reports identify the primary 
applications and processing systems that support the services offered. Recordkeepers and service 
providers can report their results in two ways. First, they can generate a Service Organization 
Control (SOC 2) report, conducted under the AICPA audit standards. This focuses on controls at 
a firm relevant to security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, or privacy (AICPA 
2017). Second, they can produce an Agreed Upon Procedures (AUP) report, in which an auditor 
is contracted to issue a report or findings based on specific agreed-upon procedures with the client 
applied to cybersecurity controls for use by specified parties (AICPA – AT-C Section 215).3 
Section III of the SOC 2 or the cover page of an AUP would be used to address which 
systems are within the scope of the audit and which are not. The scope of these audits includes 
anywhere customer or plan-provided NPI or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is processed 
or stored. PII is defined as (US Department of Labor 2017, n.p.): 
Any representation of information that permits the identity of an individual to whom the 
information applies to be reasonably inferred by either direct or indirect means. Further, PII is 
defined as information: (i) that directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address, social 
security number or other identifying number or code, telephone number, email address, etc.) 
or (ii) by which an agency intends to identify specific individuals in conjunction with other 
data elements, i.e., indirect identification. (These data elements may include a combination of 
gender, race, birth date, geographic indicator, and other descriptors) … Additionally, 
information permitting the physical or online contacting of a specific individual is the same as 
personally identifiable information. This information can be maintained in either paper, 
electronic or other media.  
 
NPI is defined as (Federal Trade Commission 2002, 4-5): 
 
 
Any information an individual gives you to get a financial product or service (for example, 
name, address, income, social security number, or other information on an application); Any 
information you get about an individual from a transaction involving your financial product(s) 
or service(s) (for example, the fact that an individual is your consumer or customer, account 
numbers, payment history, loan or deposit balances, and credit or debit card purchases); or Any 
information you get about an individual in connection with providing a financial product or 
service (for example, information from court records or from a consumer report).  
 
The detailed control objectives section of the auditor’s report must include each control objective, 
the test procedures, and the results. The format for this report should follow a format similar to 
that outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 here 
 How cybersecurity testing results are reported can differ in several ways. First, firms can 
choose to perform an AUP engagement. This is one in which an auditor is engaged to issue a report 
and findings based on specific agreed-upon procedures that apply to certain subject matters for use 
by specified parties. In this case, the specified parties would typically be a client plan sponsor that 
requires independent proof of cybersecurity capabilities. Under AICPA guidelines, the specified 
parties determine the procedures they believe appropriate to be used by the auditor. This creates a 
slight challenge when using the SPARK Industry Best Practices, since these 16 categories and the 
controls aligned to these categories by the recordkeeper must be accepted as appropriate by the 
client. Client acceptance of the procedures can take several forms and be a formal letter or a simple 
email.4 
A SOC 2, or Service Organization Control report 2, addresses a firm’s controls related to 
operations, availability, security, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. The report 
follows the five AICPA Trust Services principles and includes detailed descriptions of the 
auditor’s test of controls and results. 
 
 
 
The Role of an ERISA Attorney 
While investment consultants often play a lead role, ERISA attorneys are regularly deeply 
involved in the Request for Proposal (RFP) process when a retirement plan puts services out to bid 
and in the response to such requests. By understanding the SPARK Best Practices prior to entering 
into the RFP process, the ERISA attorney can facilitate communication between the parties. 
ERISA attorneys for recordkeeping institutions can use this knowledge to respond to RFPs that 
may, at first, not necessarily focus on cybersecurity in a coherent manner. By providing thoughtful 
responses and information to an RFP request, the ERISA attorney can focus plan sponsors on the 
items most appropriate for a benefit plan. While procurement and technology personnel are adept 
at cybersecurity as it relates to the plan sponsor’s business, the ERISA attorney will be able to 
provide guidance regarding norms for benefit plans, which will help align a plan fiduciary’s 
behavior with that of other prudent experts in similar circumstances in keeping with ERISA’s 
standard of care. By facilitating understanding of the standards and practices, an informed ERISA 
attorney can help the benefit plan seek and obtain cybersecurity protection appropriate for 
particular needs of a retirement plan, while also reducing liability exposure for the plan’s fiduciary. 
 
The Road Ahead for Cyber Security and Employee Benefits 
Plan sponsor next steps. Plan sponsors will need to quickly educate themselves about the benefit 
plan cybersecurity environment. This could involve a presentation to plan sponsor personnel with 
responsibility for a retirement plan, or by attending a conference for human resource professionals 
regarding plan cybersecurity. Awareness of the issue can help obtain buy-in to expend resources 
so as not to lag behind other plan stewards. Education can also help set realistic expectations, 
 
 
because total prevention is not achievable, and total outsourcing of cybersecurity is also unlikely. 
With these fundamentals established, a plan sponsor can begin or further a productive endeavor 
towards retirement plan data security that meets the applicable fiduciary standards. 
Moreover, plan fiduciaries might consider going on a ‘data diet’ to reduce the amount of 
retirement plan information shared among the plan, the plan sponsor, and service providers. Like 
any diet, the first step is to identify what data are currently being collected, produced, retained, 
and shared. From there, it is likely that a plan sponsor may be able to identify excess at each of 
these stages. As part of this process, plan sponsors might evaluate whether each recipient truly 
requires the full scope of data being shared to accomplish the task at hand, and if not, whether 
there is an operationally efficient manner to reduce the creation, transfer, and storage of excess 
data. By reducing the data at play, a plan sponsor can limit the plan’s exposure to a cybersecurity 
attack. Of course, the degree to which a plan sponsor will have leverage to modify existing 
practices is likely to depend on the size and assets of its plan. 
ERISA does not mandate a written cybersecurity or financial information policy, and there 
is no one-size-fits-all approach that must be taken. Instead, a plan sponsor must act prudently. The 
easiest way to show that a plan sponsor has followed a prudent process is to document that process. 
Creating any prescriptive document beyond those required by ERISA can carry significant 
challenges and risks, so cybersecurity documents should focus on process items rather than 
attempting to lay out any hard and fast rules. 
Cybersecurity incidents or breaches involving plan sponsors are a question of when, not if. 
Therefore, plan sponsors might also consider a response-and-recovery plan. The timing of the 
development of such a plan can vary widely—from proactively or after-the-fact. Fiduciary 
insurance is typically triggered when a lawsuit is filed or regulatory investigation is commenced 
 
 
(or sometimes when a regulator asserts a deficiency), while cyber insurance is often triggered by 
a data breach. This means that while existing fiduciary insurance may help after a lawsuit is filed, 
but prior to that point, the plan and/or plan sponsor may be responsible for the costs and mechanics 
associated with a breach (depending on the terms of the insurance policy). These include finding, 
hiring, and paying for experts to assess the scope of the breach and develop a mitigation plan, as 
well as finding the capacity to notify and respond to participant inquiries regarding an incident.  
Plan sponsors may wish to seek specific cyber insurance policies or riders to existing 
policies (some of which are available in the market today) to cover the employee benefit plan(s). 
Policies that provide benefits upon a breach can offer assistance in locating the appropriate 
personnel to address each step of the process, from determining the scope of the breach, to 
notifying the appropriate individuals or entities, to providing resources to mitigate, or making 
whole any damages suffered as a result of the breach, such as identity monitoring or replacing 
stolen assets. Plan sponsors will also wish to consider how to evaluate and update their plan-related 
cybersecurity approach on a periodic basis. 
 
Conclusion 
The cybersecurity environment for retirement plans is undergoing significant evolution, 
and this evolution is likely going to continue to accelerate. While the precise fiduciary obligations 
of plan sponsors with respect to plan and participant information are not yet clearly defined, it is 
clear that multiple efforts are underway to define those obligations, and to respond to the increasing 
need to strengthen protections. Presently, the SEC, the DOL, multiple states, and key industry 
organizations like SPARK are working to regulate cybersecurity and develop increased 
protections. 
 
 
 As these efforts proceed, it is essential that plan sponsors work together with their vendors, 
including recordkeepers, consultants, accountants and attorneys to put in place adequate 
safeguards. For these safeguards to be successful, it will also be essential to develop common 
practices for conducting due diligence with respect to these safeguards while also avoiding 
disclosures that may help malicious actors. The SPARK standards, applied via a SOC2 or AUP, 
can serve as an essential starting point and provide the opportunity to receive assurance of industry-
vetted practices via a trusted third party. Plan sponsors may also benefit from careful review of 
their insurance coverages with respect to cybersecurity, as there is a wide range of available 
protections including common gaps with respect to when policies are triggered or what they 
provide. 
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Endnotes 
1 This chapter refers to ‘plan sponsors’ as including both plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries. 
Although there are important lines between plan sponsor ‘settlor’ advice and fiduciary activities, 
for ease of communication we have used the term ‘plan sponsor’ throughout. 
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 25). 
3 Under AICPA standards, an AUP is only to be used by the parties that agreed to the procedures.  
Any AUP that is used over again for new clients would first require that client to accept the 
original agreed upon procedures. 
4 A self-assessment using the SPARK Institute’s Cyber Security Best Practices is only a stopgap 
process to help aid in industry adoption. Recordkeeping firms can use the SPARK 16 Cyber 
Security Categories and report their controls and test results without third-party attestation, but 
only until they can contract with their audit firms to do independent reporting. 
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Table 6.1. Sample Format: SPARK Data Security Report 
 
Controls Test Procedures Results 
Each control tested is defined 
and aligned to one of 
SPARK’s 16 key areas of 
security focus. 
Test parameters: Define what 
was tested and how test was 
performed. 
Summarize test results (i.e., 
no exceptions noted or 
exception noted and provide 
details). 
 
Source: The SPARK Institute (2017). 
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Table 6.2. Spark Institute 16 Control Objectives for Communicating Cybersecurity Capabilities 
 
Control Objective Description Sample Controlsa 
(1) Risk Assessment 
and Treatment 
The organization understands the 
cybersecurity risk to organizational 
operations (including mission, 
functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, and individuals. 
Technology risk assessments 
are completed. 
(2) Security Policy Organizational information security 
policy is established. 
Security policies are 
approved and communicated. 
(3) Organizational 
Security 
Information security roles and 
responsibilities are coordinated and 
aligned with internal roles and external 
partners. 
A CISO or ISO has been 
assigned. 
(4) Asset 
Management 
The data, personnel, devices, 
systems, and facilities that enable the 
organization to achieve business 
purposes are identified and managed 
consistent with their relative 
importance to business objectives and 
the organization’s risk strategy. 
IT application records are 
maintained in a formal 
system of record. 
(5) Human Resource 
Security 
The organization’s personnel and 
partners are suitable for the roles they 
are considered for, are provided 
cybersecurity awareness education and 
are adequately trained to perform their 
information security-related duties and 
responsibilities consistent with related 
policies, procedures, and agreements. 
Personnel are subject to 
initial and periodic 
background checks 
(6) Physical and 
Environmental 
Security 
Physical access to assets is managed 
and protected. 
Data centers are secured 
24x7x365 with on-site 
physical security controls. 
(7) Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
Technical security solutions are 
managed to ensure the security and 
resilience of systems and assets, 
consistent with related policies, 
procedures, and agreements. 
Networks and systems include 
standard data security tools 
such as firewalls, antivirus, 
intrusion detection, and patch 
management. 
(8) Access Control Access to assets and associated 
facilities is limited to authorized users, 
processes, or devices, and to 
authorized activities and transactions. 
Unique, complex passwords 
are assigned to all 
employees. 
(9) Information 
Systems 
Acquisition 
Development 
A system development life cycle 
(SDLC) to manage systems is 
implemented; a vulnerability 
management plan is developed and 
Regular penetration tests are 
conducted on customer-
facing applications. 
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implemented, and vulnerability scans 
are performed. 
(10) Incident and 
Event 
Communications 
Management 
Response processes and procedures 
are executed and maintained to ensure 
timely response to detected 
cybersecurity events. 
Cyber incident procedures 
are documented and routinely 
tested. 
 
(11) Business 
Resiliency 
Response plans (Incident 
Response and Business Continuity) 
and recovery plans (Incident Recovery 
and Disaster Recovery) are in place 
and managed. 
The organization maintains 
and tests BCP and DR plans. 
(12) Compliance Legal requirements regarding 
cybersecurity, including privacy 
and civil liberties obligations, are 
understood and managed 
Policies and procedures are 
in place to enforce applicable 
privacy obligation. 
(13) Mobile A formal policy shall be in place and 
appropriate security measures shall be 
adopted to protect against the risks of 
using mobile computing and 
communication facilities. 
A mobile policy is approved 
and enforced. 
(14) Encryption Data-at-rest and data-in-transit are 
protected. 
External transmissions are 
encrypted using FIPS-
approved algorithms. 
(15) Supplier Risk Ensure protection of the organization’s 
assets that is accessible by suppliers. 
Suppliers are subject to 
periodic security reviews. 
(16) Cloud Security Ensure protection of the organization’s 
assets that are stored or processed in 
cloud environments 
Cloud providers are subject 
to periodic security reviews 
or can provide independent 
security assessments of their 
environment. 
 
Notes: 
a For illustrative purposes only; not intended to be a list of controls. 
 
Source: The SPARK Institute (2017). 
